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The  Impact of Firm Characteristics on 
Plant Closing Decisions 
I. Introduction 
The  fami 1  iar debate  about  the effect of  market  structure on  efficiency  has 
taken a new  twist in  recent analyses  of firm  behavior during an  industry's 
decline.  Few  economists would  expect  such  firm  characteristics as  size or 
extent of  diversification,  to  determine which plants  survived a contraction. 
Rather,  regardless of the owni ng-firms'  characteristics,  they  would  expect 
high-cost plants with older capital  to shut down,  because  these plants earn 
the  1  east quasi-rent and  require replacement  investments  sooner.  Setti  ng 
aside  the possibility of firm  economies  of scale,  an  owning  firm  should not 
affect  this outcome. 
But game-theory  analyses of contraction have  discovered different 
possibilities.  If a firm  can  convince  its  rivals that its  plants will remain 
open,  the other firms might be  forced out of the market.  Normally,  a firm 
would  ignore a rival  's threat to  continue operating higher-cost capacity,  and 
it  is difficult  to see  how  any  such  threat could ultimately alter a 
contraction pattern.  But  recent studies of  exit decisions  suggest  that such 
firm characteristics as  size or number  of plants,  unrelated to  plant-level 
production costs,  may  affect the order of plant closings  (Ghemawat  and 
Nalebuff,  C19851;  Whinston,  C19871).  In  these models,  such  characteristics 
increase the credi  bli  ty  of a firm's threat to  remain  in  the market  regardless 
of  current losses,  thus  forcing other firms to  reduce  capacity first. 
In  these models,  demand  ultimately declines  to  zero.  Thus  the analyses 
indicate possible effects an  owning  firm  can  have  on  the order of  plant 
closings only;  there is  no question of  any plant surviving in  the long run. -2- 
But  some  of the authors of the analyses  discussed here  suggest  that one  might 
apply  their models  to industries undergoing  severe,  though  not complete, 
contraction. 
This paper  examines  the plant-closing decisions integrated steel firms in 
the United States made  from 1977  to  1987,  a decade  of significant contraction, 
to  determine  whether  firm  characteristics have  influenced either the 
probability of a plant's closing or the timing of its closing.  A  sample  of  49 
steel plants,  which  includes  almost all the carbon  steelmaking capacity owned 
by  integrated firms in  1976  is identified.  Using a logit estimation model, 
the influence of plant and  firm  characteristics on  the probability of a plant 
surviving through 1987  is  assessed. 
The  variables used  to capture important differences  in the plants include 
proxies for (1)  shifts in  demand  for their products;  (2) their production 
costs relative to other plants;  and  (3) the age  of their capital stock in 
1976.  Under  basic exit theory,  variation across  plants in  these 
characteristics should determine  which  plants close.  In  addition,  some 
firm-related variables,  including the size of the owning firm,  whether  the 
firm owns  more  than one  plant,  and  the firm's degree of  diversification,  are 
included to  determine  their influence on  a plant's probability of closing,  all 
other factors held equal. 
The  resulting equations  are estimated using a logit model,  with the 
dependent  variable equal  to zero if the plant was  sti  11 open  in  1987,  and 
equal  to  one if it  had  closed.  Then,  the residuals generated by estimating 
the various specifications are examined  for evidence  that firm  characteristics 
affect  the order of exit.  The  number  of years a plant had  been  closed as  of 
the end of 1987  is  regressed on  the estimated probability of  a plant's exit as 
well  as on  variables  that represent the owning-firm's  characteristics. 11.  Theory 
In a contracting industry where  firms are price-takers,  those  plants with 
lower  expected revenues,  higher costs,  and  older capital should close first, 
because  they earn  the  least quasi-rent and  require major  replacement 
investment  sooner.  The  following paragraphs,  however,  discuss  several  avenues 
by  which  firms might alter either the order of exit or the ultimate survival 
of a plant. 
First,  firm  economies  of scale may  influence a plant's probability of 
closing.  If these  economies  exist,  the plants owned  by  larger firms would, 
ceteris paribus,  experience lower  costs,  providing them  an  advantage  over 
plants owned  by  smaller  firms. 
Second,  a firm  might be  able to  convince  its  rivals that it  will remain  in 
the business  regardless of their plant-closing decisions.  To  make  such  a 
threat credible,  the firm  would  have  to  convince  rivals of its  willingness and 
ability to  sustain losses if its  rivals do  not exit.  Drawing on  the 
literature analyzing wars  of  attrition,  Ghemawat  and  Nalebuff  (1985)  developed 
a model  in  which  the credibility of the  threat depends  on  the firm's size. 
In  this model,  an  industry consists of two  single-plant firms  (firm 1 and 
firm  2)  facing a smoothly  declining demand  curve.  The  firms always  operate  at 
full  capacity,  and  each  firm  knows  its  rival's costs.  They  assume  subgame 
perfection,  so  that only credible threats work.  The  time of optimal  exit for 
a firm  alone  in the market  is the point at which demand  exactly equals  plant 
capacity.  Thus,  after demand  falls below  the capacity of the combined  firms, 
the larger firm  1  would,  if  firm 2 stays  in,  take losses and  then exit at tl, 
or if firm  2  exits,  earn monopoly  profits and  exit at tl. -4- 
But  firm  2 can operate profitably in  the industry until t2.  As  long as 
firm 2  expects  to  make  enough  monopoly  profit between tl and  t2 (the period 
after  firm  1  will have  exited in  any  case,  but before firm  2 must  exit)  to 
cover  the losses  incurred after the break-even point when  both firms still 
operated,  it  will remain  in  the market.  Since  the larger  firm  cannot  credibly 
threaten to stay in  the market  after tl, it  will avoid useless  losses  by 
exiting immediately  when  the break-even  point for the industry at its  original 
total capacity is  reached. 
Ghemawat  and  Nalebuff  (G&N)  demonstrate  that even if scale economies  give 
the large firm  a sizable cost advantage,  it  will exit first.  Their model 
includes firms with either one  plant,  or several  plants of the same  size. 
Extending this model  to  more  complex  cases,  Whinston  (1987)  found that,  whi le 
firm size may  we1 1  influence strategic behavior,  one  cannot  safely assume  the 
simple result that the largest firm  will exit first.  As G&N  showed,  a firm's 
abi  1  ity  to  force rivals out with threats to  maintain capacity depends  on  the 
timing of a firm's plant-closing decisions if it  were  alone  in  the market,  and 
this timing,  in  turn,  depends  on  the number  and  size of the  firm's plants 
compared  to  those  owned  by  its  rivals.  Though  strategic behavior  certainly 
exists,  no  easy  rule can  be  derived relating exit behavior  to  firm or plant 
size,  much  less to  plant costs. 
Third,  other possible mechanisms  for establishing a credible commitment  to 
the remaining market might also exist.  For  one  thing,  as  G&N  pointed out, if 
capital constraints exist,  they could affect the order of  exit, much  the  way 
firm size does,  by  determining which  firm  could credibly threaten to  incur 
losses.  In this case,  the constrained firm  would  exit first. 
Alternatively,  capital constraints on  some  firms could influence which 
plants survived a contraction.  To  affect the probabi  1 i  ty  of  a plant's -5- 
ultimate survival,  these  constraints  would  have  to  ensure  that a firm's profit 
maximizing-option would  be  to close  its  plants permanently rather than sell 
them.  Even if the firm  went  bankrupt because  of capital  constraints,  these 
constraints would not affect the plant,  unless  neither the  firm  nor  any  buyer 
untertook to  operate it. 
It  has  also been  suggested  that single-plant firms or undiversified firms 
might be  less willing to  close plants,  because  of a relatively greater 
susceptibi  1  i  ty to  agency  problems  in  this particular situation. If  those 
making  plant-closing decisions  in  such  firms have  low opportunity costs, 
perhaps  attributable to  specific human  capital , then  they might,  ceteri  s 
paribus,  hesitate to  close their plants.'  For  non-profit-maximizing 
decisions  to  persist,  of course,  the market  for corporate  control must  fai 1. 
111.  Specification and  Data 
A.  Specification 
Ideally,  one  would  study  the decisions  steel  firms make  about  which plants 
to  close,  and  when  to  close them,  with panel  data detai  1 ing the expected 
profi tabi  1 i  ty  of each  plant each  year  and  the condition of the owni ng-firm 
each  year.  But  because  the contraction extended  over  a prolonged period,  only 
a few  plant closings occurred in  a year,  which  limited the possibilities for 
using time-series as  well as  cross-section data. 
Instead,  the  industry's plant-closing decisions are studied in  these  two 
steps.  First,  a cross-section of data on  each  plant is  used  to  estimate  the 
probabi 1  ity  of each  plant closing,  where  the dependent  variable is  zero if the 
plant remained open,  and  one if it  closed.  The  independent  variables include 
the  information about  each  plant that neoclassical  exit theory  specifies as -6- 
important:  each  plant's long-run expected  revenues  and  costs,  and  the age  of 
its  capital stock.  In  addition,  several  different sets of variables are 
tested as  proxies for the various firm  effects suggested. 
When  one  compresses  what  is  actually a process  occurring over  an  extended 
time  into a cross-section,  one  loses  information about  changes  over  time  in 
the plants'  relative standing and  in  the status of the owning-firm.  The 
nature of the changes  in competitive conditions taking place make  the relative 
profitability of steel plants during this period appear  to  have  been  largely 
determined  by  such  stable factors as  plant location and  product mix,  implying 
that a relatively profitable plant in  1977  would  still be  relatively 
profitable in  1987.  Those  variables  that depend  on  time are measured  in 
the year  1976,  the year  before the first  major  plant closings occurred. 
Similarly,  all information about  the firms  derives from 1976.  Thus,  the 
estimates indicate how  a firm's initial position might affect its  subsequent 
plant-closing decisions.  It  is  possible that,  by  changing  size or by other 
strategi  c maneuvers  during the period,  firms i  ntroduced new  el  ements  that took 
effect  at different times.  If, however,  advantages  that can  permanently 
affect a plant's viability are attached to  particular firm  configurations, 
then those  firms initially possessing such  characteristics  should,  ceteris 
paribus,  be  less willing to  close their plants,  and  the estimated coefficients 
should capture  the entire effect. 
Thus,  the probability of a plant closing between  1977  and  1987  is 
estimated on  cross-section data,  and  the effect of firm  characteristics on 
this probability is  evaluated.  The  estimated probabilities are then used  in 
the second  step of the investigation,  in  which  the effect of firm 
characteristics on  the order of  closings  is  examined. 
A  regression of the number  of years  a plant has  been  closed on  the 
estimated probability of a plant's closing provides  information on  the order - 7  - 
of  plant closings.  With  the estimated probability of closing held constant, 
the various  firm  characteristics included in this regression indicate the 
influence  these  factors have  on  the speed  with which a plant closes. 
Thus,  the  first  requirement  is to isolate variables that capture  the 
important differences in  relative long-run profitability among  plants.  Two 
variables,  COAST  and  SHAPES,  capture  the relative impact across  plants of the 
growth of import and  minimill competition.  The  variable COAST  is zero for 
inland plants,  and  one  for plants on  a coast.  Since the transportation costs 
for  imported  steel  are lower  in  these  areas,  coastal  plants are expected  to  be 
at a relatively greater disadvantage  versus  imports,  and  thus  to  have  lower 
expected revenues.  The  coefficient of  this variable should be  positive. 
The  variable SHAPES  represents the percentage  of the plant's hot-rolling 
capaci ty  devoted  to  plates  , bars,  structural shapes,  and  other heavy  shapes. 
Plants producing these products  are assumed  to  face a relatively larger 
decrease  in  demand.  Minimi 11s  produce  some  of these  products,  and  others are 
produced  for industries,  like shipbuilding or railroads,  that are  themselves 
undergoing  contraction.  Si  nce  duri  ng  the period under  examination  these 
product markets  should have  been  particularly competitive,  the coefficient  of 
this variable should be  positive. 
In  addition to  expected  revenue,  cost variations among  plants should 
influence  the firms'  closing decisions.  Two  variables,  LG(PS1ZE)  and  EARC, 
represent  these  variations.  The  variable LG(PSIZE1,  the log of a plant's 
raw-steel capacity,  captures  cost variations across plants.  Since  significant 
economies  of scale exist in  this industry,  larger plants are expected  to  have 
lower  costs,  thus  raising their profitability relative to  smaller  plants.  The 
log of PSIZE  is  used  under  the assumption  that the disadvantage  of the  smaller -8- 
plants relative to the largest is  greater  than their disadvantage relative to 
medium-sized   plant^.^  The  coefficient of this variable is  expected  to  be 
negative,  as  a larger size reduces  the probability of closing,  ceteris 
pari  bus. 
A  dummy  variable,  EARC,  controls for a basic difference in technology 
among  the plants in  the sample.  Four  of the plants used  only electric-arc 
steel  furnaces  in  1976,  which  reduced  their disadvantage  against minimills and 
imports  as  well  as  reducing the possible gains from economies  of scale.  Thus, 
these mills should be  less  likely to  exit,  and  the sign of the coefficient 
should be  negative. 
Finally,  a variable,  LG(AGE1,  controls for differences  in the ages  of the 
plants'  capital  stocks.  If, in  a contracting industry,  the plants were 
otherwise identical,  the oldest ones  would  exit first  because  their 
reinvestment  decisions would  arise first.  The  variable LG(AGE1  represents  the 
log of the percentage of the plant's capital stock for which  new  investment 
was  announced  after 1959  but before 1977.  Since plants containing more 
later-vintage capital can  operate longer  without making major  replacement 
investments,  mills with younger  capital  in  1976  are expected  to  have  a lower 
probability of  exit during the industry's contraction. 
The  log of the percentage  is  used  because  varying depreciation rates among 
different types  of  equipment,  and  the  truncated nature  (no pre-1960  investment 
information)  of the data used,  made  differences  among  plants that received no 
investment and  those  that received some  appear  to  be  more  important than 
differences  between  those  that received some  investment and  those  that 
received a lot.  The  sign of the coefficient  should be  negative,  since a plant 
with a greater percentage of newer  capital  is likelier to  remain open. -9- 
In sum, these five variables capture all  the important variation among 
plants attributable to a plant itself, and they represent relative expected 
revenues, relative production costs, and the relative ages of capital stocks 
in the mid-1970s.  The following variables are adopted as proxies for firm 
characteristics:  First, the firm's annual raw steel capacity in 1976, FSIZE, 
represents firm size, a significant variable if either firm economies of scale 
or the G&N  analysis relating the abi  1  i ty to make a credible threat to  firm 
size affects the probability of exit among steel  plants. 
Since, however, Whinston's  (1987)  analysis indicates that size alone does 
not determine strategic advantage in more complex industry configurations, two 
a1  ternative sets of variables are used to capture the influence of both the 
owning-firm's size and number of its plants on the probability of  a plant's 
closing.  First, a set of dummy variables, Dl-D6, is  included to control for 
the number of plants.  If firms with a particular number of plants have an 
advantage, then the coefficient of their group dummy wi 11 be negative and 
significant. 
Since firm size and number of plants are correlated, this grouping roughly 
controls for both firm size and plant number, although some examples of 
smaller multi-plant firms and larger single-plant firms did appear. 
Therefore, the model is reestimated with an alternative set of dummies, DA-DE, 
that represent groups of  firms sorted first by size and then by number of 
plants in 1976.  If a particular configuration of  firm size and number of 
plants affected the probability of plants' survival, the coefficient of that 
group should be significant. 
Finally, two additional variables, UNDIV and ONE, test for the possibility 
that capital constraints or agency problems affected plant-closing decisions - 10 - 
in the  steel  industry.  The  variable,  UNDIV,  is the dollar value of a firm's 
sales of steel products  in  1976,  divided by  its total sales  in 1976.  It  is 
assumed  to be  positively correlated with both a  firm's inability to  access 
internal  cash  flows unaffected by  the industry's  decline and  to  the likelihood 
that senior management  wi  11 tend to  resist plant-closing decisions.  If a more 
diversified firm  uses  funds  from deep  pockets  to subsidize  its steel  capacity, 
then the plants it  owns  should be  less likely to exit.  Thus,  the coefficient 
of  UNDIV,  which  increased  with the firm's specialization,  should be  positive. 
Alternatively,  a diversified firm  might be  more  likely to  close its steel 
plants if its  management  expects  to  lose less by  the closures,  a situation 
that would produce  the opposite sign for the coefficient of  UNDIV.  In 
addition,  the dummy  variable,  ONE,  which  is  one  for  single-plant firms and 
zero for multi-plant firms,  is  also included to  control for differences  in  the 
probability of closing that might occur  because  of a management's 
unwillingness  to  close  its  only steel  plant.6 
Three  specifications are estimated: 
(1)  P =  f(COAST,  SHAPES,  EARC,  LG(AGE),  LG(PSIZE),  FSIZE,  ONE,  UNDIV) 
(2)  P =  f(COAST,  SHAPES,  EARC,  LG(AGE>,  LG(PSIZE>,  UNDIV,  Dl,  D2,  D3,  D4, 
D5,  D6) 
(3) P =  f(COAST,  SHAPES,  EARC,  LG(AGE>,  LG(PSIZE>,  UNDIV,  GI,  G2,  G3,  G4, 
G5,  G6). B.  Data 
The  sample  is a set of 49  steelmaking plants owned  by  integrated producers 
in the mid-1970s.  Whi le  not a1 1 of the plants were  integrated,  each  firm 
owned  at least one  integrated plant.  A  plant 'closed'  when  its steelmaking 
furnaces  shut down,  and  19  of the plants closed during the period under 
study.  In  addition,  three other plants that experienced  capacity reductions 
of  over  65  percent were  included among  exited plants,  bringing the total 
closed to  21,  or 43  percent of the  sample.  Table  1 lists the plants,  their 
owning-firms,  and  their open  or closed status as  of the end  of 1987. 
Plants located on  or near  the East,  West,  or Gulf Coasts  have  a value of 
one  for the dummy  variable COAST;  all others have  a value of zero. 
The  variable  , SHAPES,  represents  the percentage  of hot-rol  1  ed  capaci  ty that 
produced plates,  structural shapes  and  pi  1  ings,  and  hot-rol  led bars and  bar 
shapes.  The  capacity data derives from the early 1960s,  the last period for 
which  detailed product  data was  published.  A  plant's size,  PSIZE,  is its 
annual  raw-steel capacity in  1976,  as  reported by  the Institute for  Iron and 
Steel  Studies  (IISI,  1979). 
To  calculate the vintage of the plant's capital  stock,  the percentage of 
the capacity in each of  four major  departments  (coke-making,  blast furnace, 
steel  furnace,  and  primary rolling or continuous  casting)  that had  been 
replaced after 1959  was  calculated.'  This  sum  was  then divided by  the 
number  of these  departments  the plant operated.  Thus,  this figure measures 
the amount  of  reinvestment  that had  taken place,  corrected for the number  of 
these  departments  located at the plant and  for the size of the replacement 
within each  department. 
The  variable FSIZE  represents  the annual  raw-steel capacity of the firm in 
1976  as  reported by  the IISI (19791,  excluding the plants omitted from  the - 12 - 
sample.  (Table  2  lists each  firm,  its size,  and  the number  of  its  plants 
included in  the  sample.  Table  2  also includes a list  of the members  of  each 
set of groups. 1  The  variable UNDIV  represents  the ratio  of steel  sales  to 
total sales  reported by  the corporation owning  the plants in its  annual  report 
of  1976. 
IV.  Empirical  Evidence 
A.  Probi t Estimation Results 
Table  3 presents  the estimates of equations  1 through 3.  In  addition, 
column  4  shows  the results of estimating the  closing probabilities with the 
plant variables alone.  With  the exception of LG(PS1ZE)  in  equation 3,  the 
coefficients  of  the plant-characteristic variables all have  the predicted sign. 
The  coefficients of  COAST  and  SHAPES  are positive and  significant, 
indicating that location and  product mix were  important factors in  determining 
the probability that a plant would  close.  As  expected,  the coefficients 
indicate that plants located on  a coast or specializing in steel  shape 
production were  more  likely to  close. 
The  coefficient of  EARC  is  always  negative  and  is significant in  equation 
4.  The  sign of  the coefficient indicates that,  all other factors being equal, 
electric-arc-based plants were  likelier to  remain open  than other plants. 
Overall,  the strength of the results is surpri  si  ng--especi  a1  ly  since only four 
electric-arc-based plants appeared  in  the sample--two  of the four closed.  In 
equations  2 and  3,  in  particular,  the small  t-statistics  may  be  the result of 
very small  samples:  The  coefficient in  these  equations estimates  the effect 
of  using electric-arc technology on  a plant's probability of closing within 
each group,  and  the number  of such  plants in  each  group  is,  in  most  cases, 
zero or one. - 13 - 
The  coefficient of LG(AGE>  is,  as  expected,  negative,  but not significant 
except  in  equation 3.  The  results imply that, over  the entire sample,  the 
probability of exit is  increased by an older vintage of capital,  though not 
significantly.  But when  the sample  is grouped  by  firm  and  plant size,  vintage 
becomes  significant,  implying that the age  of the capital  stock affects  the 
relative probabi 1  i  ty  of a plant's exit for plants owned  by  firms  of  similar 
size and  with about  the same  number  of  plants. 
The  coefficient of LG(PS1ZE)  is  negative and  significant only in  equation 
4,  the equation  that does  not include firm-size variables.  Since 20  percent 
of the firms own  only one  plant,  and  since larger firms tend to  own  larger 
plants,  the inclusion of firm  size reduces  the significance of LG(PS1ZE). 
This  effect appears  most  strikingly in  equation 3,  which indicates that the 
effect  of LG(PSIZE1  among  firms grouped  by  size and  number  of  plants is 
negligible. 
Overall,  the characteristics of a plant appear  to  influence strongly the 
probability of its  closing.  When  all  of the  firm  variables are excluded (as 
in  equation 41,  all plant characteristics except  LG(AGE)  become  significant. 
In  the first three equations,  the coefficients of EARC  and  of LG(PS1ZE)  are 
not significant,  probably because  of the small  sample  in  the case  of  EARC  and 
correlation with the grouping in  the case  of LG(PSIZE1.  The  coefficients  of 
COAST  and  of SHAPES  remain  significant in these  three equations,  however, 
indicating the  importance  of  plant location and  product mix  for plants owned 
by all types  of firms. 
Evidence  that firm  characteristics influence the probability of a plant's 
closing is less clear.  The  coefficient of FSIZE  is  negative,  indicating that 
larger firm  size may  reduce  the probability of exit,  perhaps  because  of firm 
scale economies.  But  the coefficient is small  and  is  not significant. The  coefficient of the dummy  variable ONE  is also negative,  indicating 
that plants owned  by  single-plant firms are  less likely to  exit than all other 
plants;  however,  this coefficient is  also insignificant. 
The  coefficient of  UNDIV,  is  negative,  relatively large,  and  significant 
in  equation 3.  These  results indicate that plants owned  by  the more 
diversified firms may,  all other factors being equal,  be  more  likely to  close, 
but that this effect is particularly strong among  firms of similar size with 
similar numbers  of  plants. 
The  two  sets of group  variables,  which  classify firms  in  equation 2 by 
number  of plants and  in  equation 3  by  the number  of plants and  firm  size, 
provide clearer evidence  that a firm  effect  may  exist.  In  both equations,  the 
omitted group  is  a single-firm group consisting of  the largest firm  with the 
most  plants:  United States Steel  (USXI.  The  coefficients reported for the 
group  dummies  thus  estimate the difference in  the probability of a plant 
closing when  owned  by firms within the group  as  compared  to the probability of 
those owned  by USX  closing. 
In  equation 2,  the estimated coefficients  indicate that firms with two or 
three plants,  as  opposed  to  those with one  or with more  than three,  were  more 
likely to close plants than was  USX,  all other factors being equal.  It  could 
be  that group  2  and  group 3  plants are smaller on  average  than  those  in other 
groups,  or the firms in  these  groups  could be  smaller on  average.  But neither 
of  these possibilities appears  to  be  the case,  as  the following table shows: Mean  Plant  Mean  Firm 
D2 
D  3 
D4 








*Millions of tons of  raw  steel  capacity.  Institute for Iron and  Steel 
studies  (1979)  and  table 2 
**If  Inland Steel  is  classified as  a separate  group,  the mean  plant and 
firm  size of this group  is  2.08. 
Source:  Institute for Iron and  Steel Studies  (1979);  and  table 2. 
Rather,  these results seem  to  indicate the existence of a strategic 
disadvantage  for firms of this configuration,  since  they suggest  that these 
firms  were  more  likely to  close plants,  even  after controlling for variation 
in the plants'  expected revenues,  costs,  and  ages. 
The  results of  equation 3  provide  some  evidence  that this disadvantage 
lies in the number  of plants rather than in  firm  size.  When  the groupings are 
altered to reflect firm  size and  number  of plants,  the estimated coefficients 
indicate that only the two plants in  Group  DB,  the Wheeling-Pittsburgh firm, 
are more  likely to close than plants owned  by USX.  Given  that the group  is a 
single firm,  one  can  interpret this as  only slight evidence of  an  increased 
probability of  closing for plants owned  by  a small  multi-plant firm. 
In summary,  there is some  evidence  that a firm  effect exists when  firms 
are grouped  by  number  of plants.  The  estimated coefficients,of  D2  and  D3  may 
indicate an  inherent disadvantage  for firms owning  only two or three plants,  a 
disadvantage  that single-plant firms somehow  manage  to avoid.  This 
disadvantage  does  not appear  to stem from either smaller plant size or smaller 
firm size,  as  the estimated coefficients for groups  with both larger and 
smal ler average  plant and  firm  sizes provide no  evidence  of a higher or lower 
probability of closing for plants in those  groups. B.  Discussion 
The  probi  t results can  be  used  to  evaluate  the validity of the various 
theories of  owning-firm effects for the U.S.  steel  industry.  First,  there is 
no evidence of  a strong relationship between  an owning-firm's  size and 
probability of its  plants closing.  Larger  firms were  not more  likely to  close 
plants,  which  rules out,  for this industry,  strategic exit behavior based 
solely on  firm  size.  But  the evidence  for firm  economies  of scale is  also 
weak.  Overall,  there appears  to  be  no  systematic  relationship between  firm 
size and  the probability of  a plant closing once one  controls for plant 
characteri  sti  cs. 
Second,  1 i  ttl  e evidence  appeared i  ndi  cati  ng  that agency  problems  affect 
the plant-closing decisions of single-plant firms in  particular.  While  the 
results of  equation 1 indicate that the probabi 1 i  ty  of such  plants closing may 
be  smaller  than for a1 1 other plants,  equations  2  and  3  indicate that the 
probability may  be  greater  than the probability of  USX  closing its  plants. 
Thus,  these  estimates reveal  no  significant tendency  by single-plant firms  to 
avoid closing. 
Third,  there is  no evidence  that diversified firms use  funds  from deep 
pockets  to  subsidize high-cost capacity.  Rather,  the evidence  indicates that 
these firms are more  likely to  close their plants than more  specialized 
firms.  Possibly the degree of  a firm's diversification provides a better 
measure  of its  management's  opportunity cost than the single-plant dummy,  and 
the estimated coefficient may  thus reflect an  agency  problem,  that of 
specialized managements  delaying plant closings.  On  the other hand,  the sign 
of  this coefficient may  reflect the high cost of  closing steel mills.  These 
enormous  closing costs involve both immediate out1  ays  and ongoing expenditures - 17 - 
(Deily, 19881, and specialized firms may well  hesitate to close plants for 
fear of  bankrupt  i ng themsel  ves  . 
Finally, the coefficients of the group dummies indicate that the number of 
plants may be a more important strategic variable than firm size.  In this 
industry, firms that owned two or three plants in 1976 appear to have been at 
a disadvantage during the ensuing contraction.'  Of course, the plants these 
firms own may share some characteristic  other than those controlled for that 
puts them at a disadvantage.  But no such characteristic is immediately 
obvious. 
Overall, except for a possible strategic disadvantage related to number of 
plants, the evidence for a firm effect altering the probability of a plant 
closing is not strong.  The results of  equation 4  show that the model loses 
little of its predictive power when these variables are excluded.  (Table  4 
lists the prediction errors for equations 2 and 4.)  In addition, the 
restriction that the coefficients of  a1  1  the firm characteristic variables 
equal zero may be accepted statistically.  While low t-statistics do  not 
necessarily exclude a variable from a model, in the steel industry the 
characteristics of each plant much more than those of its owning-firm appear 
to determine the probability of it closing. 
Before turning to an examination of the order of plant exit, a more subtle 
avenue of influence for firm size is examined.  A  systematic 'firm effect' may 
arise if  the historical decisions made by  firms about where to locate plants, 
which product mix to produce, or what size plant to build are correlated with 
firm size.  Interestingly enough, regressing the variable FSIZE on the 
remaining plant variables shows that larger firms.tend to own larger plants 
and to specialize in the production of shapes.  (See  table 5.)  Some evidence 
also suggests that larger firms are more likely to have built coastal plants, - 18 - 
and  that their plants may  have  older capital.  But  these  variables are not 
significant. 
C.  Analysis of  Order  of  Exit 
This  section analyzes  YEAR,  the number  of  years  that each  plant has  been 
closed.  The  values  taken by  YEAR  range  from zero,  for all those plants still 
open  in  1987,  to  11,  for those plants that exited in  1977.  Using a tobit 
estimating procedure,  this variable was  regressed on  the predicted 
probabilities of closing for each  plant as  calculated from the estimates 
reported on  table 3  and  the three sets of firm  characteristic variables.  The 
coefficient  of the estimated probability of  closing was  positive and 
significant in  all cases,  while none  of the coefficients for the firm 
characteristic variables was  ever  significant. 
But  the inclusion in  the sample  of  plants that remain open  could have 
heavily influenced  these results;  that is,  the estimated  coefficients may  be 
explaining the qualitative open-closed aspect of the data rather than the 
number  of years a plant has  been  closed.  Therefore,  an  additional  set of 
estimates  was  calculated for the sample  of  closed plants only.9 
In  general,  the results are disappointing.  The  coefficient of  the 
estimated probability of  exit is almost always  insignificant,  as  are the 
coefficients of the  firm  characteristics variables.  As  table 6  shows,  the 
best results occur when  the firm  characteristics variables used  are the set of 
'number  of  plants'  dummies.  Column  4,  which uses  the estimated  closing 
probability based  only on plant characteristic,  P4,  shows  that this 
probability is  positive and  significant,  indicating that among  firms with the 
same  number  of plants,  the plants with the higher  probabilities of  closing 
exit sooner. - 19 - 
Some weak evidence a1  so  suggests that, after control  1  i ng for the 
probability of a plant exiting, specialized firms closed their plants more 
quickly, that single-plant firms closed their plants more quickly than USX, 
and that Republic Steel  (the  only firm owning five plants in  1976) closed its 
plants slower than USX.  The results for D3 (in  table 6,  column 4) indicate 
that firms in this group appear most likely to close their plants more quickly 
than USX only when the apparent disadvantage of  being a three-plant firm in 
1976 is not included in the estimated probabi  1  i ty of closing.  None of these 
coefficients, however, is significant at the 10-percent level for  a two-tailed 
t-test; and in sum, the results yielded little evidence that either a plant's 
characteristics or its owning-firm's status in 1976 explains the order in 
which plants closed. 
V.  Conclusions 
A  simple set of plant characteristics can explain which plants closed 
during the steel industry's  contraction.  The estimates indicate that plants 
located near a coast, plants specializing in products more likely to be 
produced by minimills, and small plants, were most likely to  close.  Larger 
plants, located inland, that produce flat-rol  led products, were least 1  ikely 
to  close, as were electric-arc-based  plants.  These five variables together 
accurately predicted the status of 86  percent of the plants. 
Some evidence also suggests that certain owning-firm characteristics 
measured before the start of the contraction affected  the probability of a 
plant's survival.  The size of the owning-firm did not appear to  affect the 
probability of a plant closing, implying that G&N's  model of strategic exit 
behavior does not explain the steel industry's experience.  But firms owning - 20 - 
just two or three plants, as opposed to  only one or more than three, may have 
been at a disadvantage in this industry.  The plants owned by these firms had, 
a1  1  other factors being equal, a higher probabi  1  i ty of closing. 
These coefficients may reflect some strategic disadvantage related to this 
particular firm configuration in the steel industry, or the effect of some 
plant characteristic omitted from the estimated equations.  Some evidence for 
the later possibility lies in the apparent historical  tendency in the steel 
industry for firms of similar types to make similar long-run decisions about 
such matters as plant location and product mix.  While studies of 
plant-closing patterns in other declining industries might help to sort out 
these two hypotheses, it seems clear for now that models of strategic behavior 
in contracting industries should include the number of a firm's  plants as an 
important variable. 
Some tentative evidence also suggests that specialized firms are more 
likely to  keep their plants in operation.  This tendency may reflect either 
agency problems resulting from specialized management with low opportunity 
costs or capital constraints working in an unusual direction--that is, 
specialized firms may be more inclined to  keep their plants open because they 
cannot afford to close them.  Most strikingly, no evidence emerged to indicate 
that diversified firms use their deep pockets to  subsidize plants. 
Finally, while plant characteristics, as embodied in estimated closing 
probabilities, and characteristics of owning-firms as of 1976, may affect the 
speed with which plants closed between 1977 and 1987, the estimated 
coefficients for these variables were almost never significant and a great 
deal of unexplained variance appeared.  Part of this poor 
estimated-closing-probabilities performance resulted from excluding all  the 
information  from plants still open.  But most of  the problem probably lies in - 21 - 
the cross-sectional nature.  of this analysi  s.  Whi le such  relatively stab1  e 
factors  as  plant location,  product mix,  and  size perform well  in  determining 
which plants eventually close,  changes  that occurred over  time in  plant 
profi  tabi  1 i  ty  and  in  firm  characteristics,  which were  ignored in this 
analysis,  might provide more  insight into the order of  plant closings. Table  1 
Plant  Status,  end-1987 
Bethl  ehem 
Republ i  c 
Bethl  ehem 
Bethl  ehem 
Bethl  ehem 
United States Steel 
Jones  &  Laughlin 
Jones  &  Laugh1  in 
United States Steel 
United States Steel 




Jones  &  Laughlin 
Republ i  c 
Republ i  c 
United States Steel 
United States Steel 
Youngstown  Sheet  &  Tube 
Youngstown  Sheet  &  Tube 
Wheel i  ng-Pi ttsburgh 
Bethl  ehem 
In1  and 
United States Steel 
Youngstown  Sheet  &  Tube 
National 
Republ i  c 





Bethl  ehem 
National 
Armco 
Republ i  c 
United States Steel 
Armco 
United States Steel 
Lone  Star 
United States Steel 






A 1  an  Wood 
Lackawanna,  NY 
Buffalo,  NY 
Bethlehem,  PA 
Johnstown,  PA 
Steel  ton,  PA 
Fairless,  PA 
A1 iquippa,  PA 
Pi  ttsburgh,  PA 
Dusquesne,  PA 
Braddock,  PA 
Homestead,  PA 
Farrell,  PA 
Monessen,  PA 
Middletown,  OH 
Cl  evel  and,  OH 
Cl  evel  and,  OH 
Warren,  OH 
Lorain,  OH 
Youngstown,  OH 
Youngstown,  OH 
Campbe 1  1  , OH 
Steubenville,  OH 
Burns  Harbor,  IN 
Indiana Harbor,  IN 
Gary,  IN 
Indiana Harbor,  IN 
Granite City,  IL 
South Chicago,  IL 
South Chicago,  IL 
Riverdale,  Chicago,  IL 
Great  Lakes,  MI 
Trenton,  MI 
Kansas  City,  MO 
Sparrows  Point,  MD 
Weirton,  WVA 
Ashland,  KY 
Gadsden,  AL 
Fairfield,  AL 
Houston,  TX 
Baytown,  TX 
Lone  Star,  TX 
Geneva,  UT 
Torrance,  CA 
Fontana,  CA 
Pueblo,  CO 
Portsmouth,  OH 
Dearborn,  MI 
South Chicago,  IL 
Conshohoken,  PA 
*The  closing of all basic-oxygen furnaces  or open-hearth furnaces  reduced 
capacity by over  65  percent. 
Source:  Wharton  Econometri cs  ( 1987) ; Hogan  (  1984,  1987) ; various  annual 
reports;  and  the author. Table  2 
Firm 





Ford Motor  Co. 




(Wisconsin  Steel  1 
Jones  &  Laugh 1  i  n 
Kaiser Steel 
Lone  Star Steel 
McLouth Steel 
National  Steel 
Republ i  c Steel 
Sharon 
United States Steel 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh 




tons of steel 
capaci  ty) 
Number  of Pl  ants 
Source:  Institute for Iron and  Steel  Studies  (1979). Table 2  (Cont.) 
Groups  Dl-D6  (Number  of Plants) 
D  1  Alan Wood,  CF&I,  Cyclops,  Interlake,  Lone  Star,  Sharon, 
International  Harvester,  Ford,  Kaiser,  McLouth,  In1  and* 
D2  Wheeling-Pittsburgh 
D  3  Jones  &  Laughlin,  National,  Youngstown  Sheet  &  Tube 
D4  Republ i  c 
D  5  Armco 
D6  Beth1  ehem 
Groups  DA-DE  (Firm Size and  Number  of  Plants) 
D  A  Alan Wood,  CF&I,  Cyclops,  Interlake,  Lone  Star,  Sharon, 
International  Harvester 
D  B  Wheeling-Pittsburgh 
DC  Ford,  Kaiser,  McLouth,  Inland* 
DD  Armco,  Jones  &  Laughlin,  National,  Republic,  Youngstown  Sheet  & 
Tube 
DE  Bethlehem 
*As  alternative specifications,  Inland was  classified as  a separate group. 
The  estimation results did not change  significantly. 
Source:  Author. Table  3 
Dependent  Variable:  1 if  plant closed* 
COAST  3.04  3.30  3.85  2.35 
(2.10)  (1.77)  (2.04)  (1.89) 
H EAVY  4.79  8.49  8.61  3.51 
(2.66)  (2.86)  (2.62)  (2.54) 
EARC  -3.32  -1.89  -2.88  -3.21 
(-1.66)  (-.62)  (-1.18)  (-1.80) 
FSIZE  -.  05 
(-1.12) 
UNDIV  -3.24  -4.36  -5.24 
(-1.501  (-1 -51  1  (-1.72) 
ONE  1.14 
(-.81> 






Log  Likelihood: -20.772  -1  5.955  -17.215  -22.654 
%  Correct**:  83.67  89.80  89.80  85.71 
*t-stati sti  cs  in  parentheses.  **Prediction  analysi  s  based on 50 percent. Table  4 
Plant 
Equation 2: 
Johns  town 





Beth1  ehem 
Johns  town 
Fai  rl  ess 
Ri  verdal  e 
,Lackawanna 
A1 i  qui  ppa 
Monessen 
Prediction Errors,  Equations 2 and  4 
Firm  -  Predicted Y 
Bethlehem  .622 
Inter1  ake  .525 
Bethlehem  .002 
Jones  &  Laugh1  in  .462 
Cyclops  .404 
Bethlehem  .684 
Bethlehem  .889 
Uni  ted States  .596 
Steel 
Inter1  ake  .698 
Bethlehem  .I07 
Jones  &  Laugh1  in  .097 
Wheeling-Pittsburgh  .340 
Actual  Y - 27 - 
Table 5 
Dependent  Variable:  FSIZE 
COAST  5.87 
(1.02) 
HEAVY  10.99 
(3.18) 
EARC 
Adj  R  SQ:  0.21 
t-Statistics in  parentheses  Number  of  observations:  49. Table  6 
Dependent  Variable:  YEAR 
UNDIV 
ADJ  R  SQ:  .01  -.  12  -.I2  .19 
*Variable Definitions: 
PI--closing probability calculated using estimates from table 3,  column  1 
P2--closing probabi  1  i  ty  calculated using estimates  from table 3,  column  2 
P3--closing probabi  1  i  ty calculated using estimates  from table 3,  column  3 
P4--closing probabi  1  i  ty  calculated using estimates  from  table 3,  column  4 
t-stati  sti  cs  in  parentheses.  Number  of  observations  :  21. FOOTNOTES 
1.  A firm might actually bolster its threat to  maintain capacity during the 
contraction by refusing to  diversify,  conveying a clear commitment  to  the 
market  . 
2.  One  exception to  this statement  is  the collapse of  the pipe market 
following  the fall in  oil prices.  Plants specializing in  pipe may  have 
changed  their relative standing with respect  to  expected profits. 
3.  See  Karlson (1983)  for selected estimates of plant-specific economies  of 
scale in  this industry. 
4.  Another  force would also reduce probability of closing:  Closing costs are 
liable to  be  much  higher  for larger plants because  of their larger work  forces 
(see  Deily,  1988). 
5.  As  an  alternative,  the number  of  plants was  used  instead of  raw-steel 
capacity as  a measure  of firm size.  The  estimation results were  quite similar. 
6.  This  dummy  variable i  s exactly equal  to  Dl and  to  DA+DC,  and  so it  is  not 
included in  equations  2  and  3.  The  coefficients have  a different 
interpretation,  however.  The  coefficient of  ONE  represents  the difference in 
the probability of closing for plants owned  by  single-plant firms versus  all 
other plants;  the coefficients of the group dummies  represent  the difference 
in  the probabi 1  i  ty  of  closing for plants in  each  group versus  the omitted 
group  (the United States Steel Corporation). 
7.  Investments  in  basic oxygen  steel  furnaces  that were  made  before 1960  were 
also counted. 
8.  Interestingly enough,  almost  a1 1 the major mergers i  nvolvi  ng  integrated 
capacity both before and  during the industry's  contraction have  involved these 
firms (that  is, Wheeling and  Pittsburgh in  1968;  National  and Granite City in 
1971;  and  Jones  &  Laughlin and  Youngstown  Sheet  &  Tube  in  1978). 
9.  In these  regressions,  the OLS  estimating procedure  was  used,  as  all 
censored (zero)  observations were  excluded. References 
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